In this paper we conduct a theoretical analysis of the implications of a union which can exploit the existence of¯rm labour adjustment costs. We consider a model involving a large number of identical¯rms facing a single, economy-wide union. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with no commitment, under the assumption that the union chooses wages each period and¯rms react by choosing employment, and (ii) for the commitment equilibria where the union can precommit to the entire (in¯nite) sequence of wages.
Introduction
Labour adjustment costs have long been cited as a possible reason for poor European unemployment performance. A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work has been carried out on this topic. Recent contributions include, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , who looked at a model with linear adjustment costs. In their model the wage is assumed to be constant over time, and their analysis is partial equilibrium. Their approach is developed in Bentolila and St.Paul (1994) who obtain closed form solutions in a discrete time model also with linear (asymmetric) adjustment costs. Almost all previous work has taken the wage to be either exogenous or¯xed at the competitive level. However if labour is not supplied competitively, but rather is unionized, then one would expect the union to behave strategically and to take into account the adjustment costs: intuitively one might expect higher adjustment costs to increase the bargaining power of the union. Because of adjustment costs, the union may be able to push up wages, knowing that the¯rm will not quickly reduce employment. Hence it might be expected that employment levels and also dynamics will di®er between competitive (or partial equilibrium) and unionised models. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a theoretical analysis of the e®ects of assuming labour adjustment costs in models with union power.
The focus of the paper is thus on the implications of a union which can exploit the existence of¯rm adjustment costs. To this end, and partly for reasons of tractability, we shall concentrate on an extreme case where the union has substantial bargaining power by assuming that (i) there is a single economy wide union facing a large number of¯rms, and (ii) the union can¯x the wage, while¯rms choose employment (¯rms have the`right to manage').
The questions which we want to ask of such a model include: (i) What e®ect does the existence and magnitude of labour adjustment costs have on employment and wage dynamics and long-term values? (ii) To what extent do the answers to (i) depend on the ability of the union to bind itself to commitments regarding future wages (i.e. to bind itself not to behave opportunistically in the future)? (iii) Is such an ability of the union to commit bene¯cial to both parties, and is commitment likely to emerge as a natural outcome of reputation building?
Strategic issues facing unions in the presence of labour adjustment costs have also been considered by Lockwood and Manning (1989) . Their model di®ers substantially from the current one: they consider a model of timeconsistent bargaining between a single¯rm and a union; moreover they focus on the e®ects of changes in bargaining strength on adjustment dynamics, and also on comparative results between the right to manage and e±cient bargaining models. A major result of their analysis is that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is increased by the existence of unions in the right to manage model. Here we obtain similar results in the no commitment case but, as we shall see, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is not a®ected by the existence of unions in the commitment version of the right to manage model. Sargent (1979) and Kennan (1988a and 1988b ) also addressed in a formally similar framework the behaviour of employment and wages in the presence of labour adjustment costs. However they concentrate mainly on the competitive case. Kennan (1988b) also considers the case of a monopolyunion that can precommit. His main results are that: (i) the commitment and the competitive outcomes are equivalent, and can be only distinguished by asking which interpretation of the parameters estimates is more plausible; (ii) when the union runs the market, if the utility function is temporally separable, there is more persistence in employment. We can reconcile this last result with our¯ndings by noting that in his model, if the marginal utility of leisure does not depend on employment (which is our case), the speed of adjustment of employment is the same in the competitive and in the commitment cases. Note however, that in this case unions decrease the speed of adjustment of employment if we assume that the union's policy must be time-consistent.
Another recent paper that addressed the modelling of employment decisions and wage-setting with unions in an intertemporal framework is the paper by de la Croix et al. (1996) . They consider a model of e±cient bargaining and habit formation, again between a single¯rm and a union, and estimate the model for three European countries. They conclude that the performance of the e±cient contract model is superior to that of the competitive model and found evidence supporting the hypothesis of a forward looking union behaviour.
Apart from our focus on the contrast between commitment and no commitment (and reputation builiding), we consider the current model to be complementary to these papers in the sense that it embodies di®erent assumptions about labour market institutions: in particular our analysis is relevant to economies in which centralized (economy wide) unions operate. We feel that an appropriate model with centralized wage determination has atomistic¯rms. Employment at plant or¯rm level is not likely to be a part of national negotiations, and the \right to manage" model (in which rms determine unilaterally, given the wage, the local employment level) is therefore relevant and indeed natural. Consequently each¯rm behaves in a non-strategic fashion, ignoring the e®ects of its employment decision on future wages, even though in the aggregate employment decisions do indeed a®ect the course of wages. Eichengreen (1993) argues that there was a general increase in centralization of wage determination in Europe during the immediate post-war decades, with countries such as Austria, Norway and Sweden being particularly strongly centralized, and Italy, Portugal and France being considerably less decentralized. He also considers, as we do, the question of commitment by the unions. In his analysis, commitment to a low wage path would encourage investment, which in turn would be bene¯cial for employment. 1 The problem is that the unions have a short-term incentive to renege on any commitment once the extra capital is installed, and to \hold-up" capital by increasing wage demands. Eichengreen argues that a number of institutional restraints on such opportunistic behaviour evolved, such as the increasing participation of labour in management decisions and the provision of public social programmes as a quid pro quo for wage restraint. The problem we analyse is similar in a number of respects: if the union could commit to wage restraint then¯rms have an incentive to increase employment up to the appropriate point on the labour demand curve; in the absence of commitment, because of adjustment costs (in particular of¯ring costs), once the extra employment is taken on, the union can again hold-up the employers by increasing wages knowing that¯rms cannot easily cut their labour forces. We show that commitment on the part of the union does indeed lead to lower wages, and moreover is bene¯cial to¯rms as well as (trivially in our model) to the union. We also show that, given that the union would like to commit to a lower wage path, reputation building is desirable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and describe the objectives of¯rms and of the union. We then characterise, in section 3, the no commitment or time consistent solution to the model. In section 4, we analyse the properties of the model when commitment is possible on the part of the union. Then we brie°y compare the previous results with a competitive version of the model. In section 5 we discuss credibility and reputational issues. Section 6 presents some empirical evidence. Section 7 contains concluding comments.
The model
We assume a single, large union which sets wages unilaterally in each period t = 0; 1; 2; : : : . There are a large number of identical (atomistic)¯rms which then choose employment at these wages. Hence each¯rm ignores any e®ect of its own decision on wages.
We describe¯rst the problem faced by the typical¯rm. It is assumed that there are a large number of identical pro¯t maximizing¯rms which produce a single homogeneous good with production functions given by F (l t ) where l t is employment in period t. The marginal product is linear:
where°< 0: We also assume that¯rms face asymmetric labour adjustment costs of the following type:
where 4l t = l t ¡ l t¡1 ; ±¸0 and we observe that a positive (negative) f implies higher hiring (¯ring) costs.
2
The real wage at time t is denoted W t and each¯rm will take the entire path of wages as being parametric. Firms maximise discounted pro¯ts using 2 One possible interpretation of a positive f is that if there is natural employment turnover, to maintain a constant workforce requires expenditure on hiring, and consequently the minimum of the adjustment cost function should be achieved at a negative value of ¢l t . Note that speci¯cation (2) should be regarded as a computationally simple way of achieving some asymmetry in adjustment costs. Indeed most of the empirical studies on the form of labour adjustment costs conclude that some asymmetry exists. (See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for a survey.) Other more general speci¯cations of asymmetric convex costs have been proposed (see Pfann and Verspagen (1989) ) but not being quadratic they are much more di±cult to handle within our framework. discount factor ½: The problem of each¯rm at time 0, given initial inherited employment b l ¡1 , current and future wages is to choose a sequence of employment levels f b l t g 1 t=0 to solve:
where we use a hat to denote an individual¯rm's employment and assume that b l ¡1 = l ¡1 ; where l ¡1 is the aggregate (average) employment inherited from period ¡1.
There is an economy-wide union which is a wage-setter, allowing¯rms to choose their employment levels in response. The union has a per-period utility given by W t l t + (n ¡ l t )b where n (assumed large relative to labour demand to ensure positive unemployment) is the total labour force and b is the reservation wage (given, for example, by the level of unemployment bene¯ts) and is assumed to be constant. This speci¯cation implies that the union is a utilitarian one with risk neutral members|see Oswald (1982) . Moreover, this speci¯cation has been widely used and for our purposes it has the convenient feature of being quadratic. The union also discounts with factor ½.
There are two alternative ways to model wage setting in our dynamic context that give rise to two di®erent equilibria. We can either assume that wages are announced period by period (the no-commitment case) or that, alternatively, the union can precommit to the entire sequence of wages in advance (the commitment case). We will consider both cases below. Note that¯rms behave identically in both cases. However, as the union does not, we obtain two di®erent equilibria.
The no-commitment case
In this case the union, by assumption, is unable to precommit its future wage setting actions. Instead, the union chooses every period t a wage W t so as to maximize its objective function taking into account not only the immediate e®ect on employment, but also the future consequences of a change in current employment, given that in the future it will reoptimise. An equilibrium consists of strategies for the union and for each¯rm with the following properties: (i) The union maximizes its continuation payo® at each point in the game given the continuation strategies of the¯rms, and (ii) Firms, which are atomistic, choose employment in each period to maximize expected discounted pro¯ts taking the time path of wages to be exogenously given (at their continuation equilibrium levels).
This equilibrium concept emerges as one natural outcome of a dynamic game in which the players make alternating moves. This type of equilibrium has been referred to in the literature as a "time-consistent equilibrium" (see, e.g., Chari , Kehoe and Prescott (1989)). A key feature of this setup is subgame perfection. In our de¯nition of equilibrium, however, we shall exclude equilibrium strategies with memory. This means that union and rm's strategies are functions of the minimal sets of variables (i.e. payo® relevant) compatible with subgame perfection. In this way our equilibrium concept can be characterized as a Markov-perfect equilibrium (see for example Maskin and Tirole (1988) ).
We de¯ne V (l t¡1 ; b l t¡1 ) to be the individual¯rm's value function (representing discounted pro¯ts), at period t. It depends on the lagged aggregate employment level because in an equilibrium the latter a®ects the future path of wages. To get the optimality equation, we¯rst need to consider the individual¯rm's problem given l t¡1 and current wages and assuming that b l t¡1 = l t¡1 in equilibrium. Let l(l t¡1 ; W t ) be the optimal choice; i.e., l(l t¡1 ; W t ) solves:
and we assume that the individual¯rm takes the decisions of other¯rms as given. Notice that future average employment, which is parametric to the individual¯rm, is itself given by the optimal choice. The FOC for this problem is:
Next, let W (l t¡1 ) be the wage at t, dependent on lagged employment (this will be solved for below). The optimality equation for V (l t¡1; b l t¡1 ) can now be written:
As we are considering the linear quadratic case we look for a linear solution where the function l t = l(l t¡1 ; W t ) is:
Likewise, turning to the problem confronting the union, let U (l t¡1 ) be the discounted utility of the union at time t, given lagged aggregate employment l t¡1 . Then the optimality equation is:
with FOC:
and the optimality equation is solved by W (l t¡1 ) which is assumed linear:
Obtaining the equilibrium
In our case the Markov perfect equilibrium consists of two functions l(l t¡1 ; W t ) and W (l t¡1 ) that are linear and given respectively by (7) and (10). The detailed computations are relegated to Appendix A.1, which shows that we have a unique equilibrium with µ f given by:
for arbitrary W t whereas in the optimality equation (6) W t is¯xed at W(l t¡1 ), which is the equilibrium wage. We need, however, to construct the function l(l t¡1 ; W t ) since the union can set W t 6 = W (l t¡1 ).
where q = (± ¡°+ ½±) so that 0 < µ f < 1:
We have that ¼ = ¡µ f =± (from (30) in Appendix A.1), so we can state that current employment depends negatively on the current wage. Moreover we also have that µ u > 0 (see Appendix A.1). This means that on the adjustment path the wage depends positively on lagged employment. The intuition is that a high lagged employment implies a higher current labour demand (µ f > 0) and therefore the union pushes up the wage.
Solving also for Ã f and Ã u we can rewrite equations (7) and (10) in the following way:
where
Consequently we can state that unemployment bene¯ts a®ect positively the wage and have a negative impact on employment, both directly and also through their e®ect on wages. Moreover asymmetry in labour adjustment costs a®ects wage and employment equilibrium levels. Higher hiring (¯ring) costs f imply a wage lower (higher) than the one that would have resulted with symmetric labour adjustment costs.
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Turning now to employment we can state that higher hiring (¯ring) costs imply an employment level, taking into account the e®ects through wages, smaller (higher) than the one that would have resulted in the symmetric case. These results are consistent with priors on these e®ects and re°ect the following type of behaviour. A¯rm in the presence of hiring costs will to some extent refrain from hiring. The union, anticipating the¯rm's reaction, pushes the wage downwards but not by enough to restore employment and therefore in equilibrium employment is smaller than it would have been in the symmetric (f = 0) case.
But even in the symmetric case adjustment costs have important e®ects on the equilibrium dynamics. In line with expectations, higher adjustment costs imply a larger (positive) e®ect of lagged employment on current labour demand since µ f is an increasing function of ±. Moreover we have that the response of wages to lagged employment, µ u , is also increasing with ±. This con¯rms the intuition that associates higher adjustment costs with more union power. Likewise, as might be anticipated, higher adjustment costs lead to a smaller (in absolute terms) employment response to wage changes.
Of more importance to the empirical implications of the model is the speed of adjustment in the equilibrium dynamics. Substituting (10) in (7) we obtain the reduced form representation for employment:
where 0 < µ f + ¼µ u < 1. Our model con¯rms the expectation that higher adjustment costs should lead to more sluggish dynamics, and shows that this is true even when the union behaves strategically in its wage setting. In view of our previous results, a high lagged employment level, for example, will be exploited by the union more (in terms of higher wage demands) when adjustment costs are greater, and this will in turn lead to a more rapid reduction in employment. Nevertheless, this latter e®ect (@¼µ u =@± < 0) is not su±cient to o®set the fact that the¯rm adjusts less quickly when ± is higher at a given wage (@µ f =@± > 0), since we have that µ f + ¼µ u (< µ f ) is an increasing function of ±:
The speed of adjustment in the reduced form employment equation 14, while larger than the speed of adjustment in the conditional labour demand, is smaller when adjustment costs are more important.
In the absence of labour adjustment costs, i.e., when ± = f = 0; we recover the traditional static union monopoly model:
and therefore
Note that we must have that Á > b in order to guarantee a positive employment level.
The steady-state
It is also of interest to analyse the properties of the model's steady-state and to compare it with the traditional static union monopoly model. Adjustment costs in°uence the steady-state levels of employment and wages. Since the union can exploit the slowness of¯rms to react to wage changes, the steady state will exhibit a higher wage (and a lower level of employment, because employment is given by the static labour demand equation) than would be found in the model without adjustment costs 7 (see Appendix A.2 for proof and further details):
Proposition 2 For any ± > 0 the steady-state wage (employment level) of the no-commitment model with f = 0 is larger (smaller) than the wage (employment level) of the static union monopoly model. When ± = 0 the two wages (employment levels) coincide.
It is easily checked that the steady-state wage (employment level) of the no-commitment model is an increasing (decreasing) function of ±.
These results imply that adjustment costs not only in°uence the dynamics of the model, but they also determine the long-run equilibrium values of employment and wages. The higher the relevance of labour adjustment costs the higher the long run wage and therefore the smaller the level of employment in the long run. As we shall see these results follow from the no-commitment structure of the model. If the union could credibly precommit its future wage setting actions, adjustment costs would have no e®ect on the determination of the long-run equilibrium levels.
The commitment case
Suppose now that there is a commitment technology to bind the future actions of the union. In this commitment version of the game, the union announces a sequence of wages once and for all at the beginning of time. Firms then choose a sequence of employment taking the time path of wages as given, i.e.,¯rms solve (3).
The FOC for this problem is:
Note that, as all¯rms are identical, expression (15) also gives us the path of aggregate (average) employment.
The union in the commitment case solves the following problem:
s:t:
To obtain the commitment solution we will use the Marcet and Marimon (1992) procedure that casts time inconsistent models in a recursive framework. They show that the solution to the problem of the union is the saddle point of the following Lagrangean:
where¸t > 0 f or all ţ ¡1 = 0 l ¡1 given where¸t is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint given by (15) at time t.
The FOC's for this problem are (15) and:
Now solving (15) for l t ; substituting it in (18) and in (19) we have the following results:
that is, in the commitment case, after the¯rst period, optimal wages are not a function of the state variable. Moreover, when labour adjustment costs are symmetric (f = 0) the union, after the¯rst period, will set a wage identical to the wage of the static union monopoly model. The intuition seems to be that the union only exploits in the¯rst period the¯rms' inability to adjust quickly; higher wages in the future have the disadvantage that¯rms will cut current labour demand in anticipation of them, whereas this is not true of the initial wage and so it is more e±cient to concentrate exploitation in thē rst period.
Equilibrium dynamics
To discuss the equilibrium dynamics in the commitment case it is convenient to rewrite expression (15) in the following way:
where x 1; x 2 are the two roots of:
Both roots are positive and real and x 1 < 1 and x 2 > 1. Using (21) we obtain the following expression for the conditional labour demand equation in the commitment case: (11) and recall that µ f is the coefcient on lagged employment in the conditional labour demand equation in the no-commitment case). Hence labour demand is more responsive to lagged employment than in the no-commitment case, though some care is needed in interpreting this. Both equations (15) and (22) are still valid in the no commitment case. This means that x 1 is still the coe±cient on lagged employment in the no commitment case before substituting for expected future wages. Once we do that we recover (12) where µ f becomes the coe±cient for lagged employment. So both in the commitment and in the no commitment cases¯rms behave identically, but as the union does not, this changes, through rational conjectures about how the union behaves in the future, the speed of adjustment in the short run labour demand equation. This means that the solution in the no commitment case also takes into account the e®ect on future wages of lagged employment. Consequently a higher lagged employment level leads in the no commitment case to higher anticipated future wages, and thus from (22) this reduces desired employment; overall then the response of labour demand is lower in this case.
Likewise, the response of current employment to current wages is bigger in the commitment case. Again, the reason for this is that in the no commitment case the current wage a®ects future wages through their e®ect on current employment, which in turn o®sets the direct impact of the current wage. Therefore the absence of a commitment technology makes employment less responsive to wages. Also, as in the no-commitment case, adjustment costs a®ect equilibrium dynamics. As x 1 is an increasing function of ± the response of conditional labour demand to lagged employment is larger when adjustment costs are higher. Consequently adjustment costs a®ect employment equilibrium dynamics in the commitment model in the same way as in the no-commitment case.
Since in the commitment case wages after the¯rst period do not respond to lagged employment, we have that the speed of adjustment of employment is the same both in the conditional labour demand equation and in the reduced form employment equation for any t > 0, contrary to what happenned in the no-commitment case. The reduced form employment equation is given by:
As x 1 > µ f + ¼µ u we can state:
The speed of adjustment in the reduced form employment equation is smaller in the commitment case than in the no commitment case.
Consequently commitment leads to more sluggish equilibrium dynamics, the reason again being that in the absence of commitment the union cannot avoid responding to, e.g., high levels of employment in such a way as to lead to faster adjustment on the part of¯rms.
8 As in the no-commitment case, in the absence of labour adjustment costs (i.e., when ± = f = 0) we recover the traditional static union monopoly model with x 1 = 0.
The steady-state
In the commitment case, contrary to the result in the no-commitment model, adjustment costs do not in°uence the steady-state values of employment and wages (when f = 0). From (15) one can see that in the steady-state, employment must be on the static labour demand equation. Moreover the steadystate wage is identical to the wage of the union monopoly model. Therefore for f = 0 in the commitment case the long run levels of employment and wages coincide with the ones of the static union monopoly model. 9 This, together with the fact that steady-state employment, both in the commitment and in the no-commitment models, is on the static labour demand shedule implies:
Proposition 4 In the steady-state, for any ± > 0, the wage (employment level) of the no-commitment model is higher (lower) than the wage (employment level) of the commitment model. When ± = 0 the two wages (employment levels) coincide.
The intuition here is that commitment to a lower wage path encourages rms to take on more labour, up to the appropriate point on the labour demand curve, whereas in the absence of commitment, maintaining a low wage would not have such an e®ect since¯rms would anticipate being held up in the future by the union demanding higher wages at a high level of employment. The union, knowing that¯rms will behave in this fashion, thus 8 Note that the results on the speed of adjustment do not depend on the production function being quadratic, i.e., they do not depend on the elasticity of labour demand. When the production function is not quadratic to solve the model a linear approximation is needed but this will not change the relative speeds of adjustment.
9 This result does not depend on the functional forms chosen. It holds, even in the absence of linear quadratic functions, provided that the time preference rates of the union and¯rms coincide.
never has an incentive to o®er such lower wages, and thus even in the steady state wages will be higher than in the static model (and thus higher than in the commitment case).
The Competitive Case
It is also of interest to compare the results obtained so far with the corresponding outcomes in the competitive case. In this case W t = b for all t if we assume that the labour force is su±ciently large relative to demand. Employment is then given by (15) with W t = b. Adjustment costs then in°uence short run employment decisions but have no e®ects on the wage. Employment equilibrium dynamics again are as in (22) so that unions only a®ect the speed of adjustment to equilibrium if they set future wages as a function of lagged employment. This happens in the no-commitment case but not in the commitment case. Therefore, in the atomistic¯rms case, unions only increase the speed of adjustment of employment in the absence of a commitment technology. Note that Lockwood and Manning (1989) also concluded that collective bargaining increases the speed of adjustment of employment in the case of a no-commitment game between a union and a single¯rm. In our case it is the existence or the absence of commitment that matters.
In the steady-state we recover the results of the static competitive model. Employment, again lies on the static labour demand equation. However, the chosen point on that schedule corresponds now to a combination with more employment and a smaller wage, W = b. Therefore,¯rm's pro¯ts are bigger but the utility of workers is smaller and given by nb. Adjustment costs therefore do not in°uence the long run outcomes. Nevertheless adjustment costs in°uence the speed of adjustment of employment in the usual way. The higher the relevance of adjustment costs the slower the speed of adjustment.
Reputation and the value of commitment
In this section, we shall consider whether commitment is valuable to the union and¯rms, and whether, in the presence of uncertainty about the motivations and intentions of the union, the commitment outcome may emerge from attempts to build reputation even in the absence of commitment technologies.
In our setup the ability to commit cannot reduce the overall utility of the union since one option available is to commit to the no commitment wage path. Since we have seen that this is not the optimal commitment path, the union must do strictly better with commitment. Nevertheless there remains the question of what happens to the payo®s of the¯rms. In the steady state, union utility can be written as a (concave) function of the wage that reaches its maximum for the wage of the commitment model (alternatively, steady state union utility is maximised at the static solution which coincides with the commitment solution). Therefore in the steadystate the utility of the union in the no-commitment case is always smaller than in the commitment case. Moreover, because the wage is higher than the static monopoly union wage and increases with adjustment costs, in the steady-state the utility of the union in the no commitment case decreases with adjustment costs. Hence although adjustment costs give the union the incentive to exploit¯rms by holding wages high, the long term consequences of this short-term incentive is lower long-term payo®s.
Also, since steady state wages are higher under no commitment, the profits of¯rms must be lower than in the commitment case. We conclude that in the long-run the existence of a commitment technology leads to higher payo®s to all parties.
To analyse whether these results still hold out of the steady-state we performed numerical simulations. Our¯ndings are that, both in the commitment and no-commitment cases,¯rms' discounted pro¯ts decrease with adjustment costs. Moreover, except when ± = 0 or ½ = 0; both¯rms' discounted pro¯ts and union utility are higher with commitment (the latter being trivially true, as remarked earlier). This shows the value of a commitment technology: the utility of the union must be higher because precommitment is helpful, and according to our simulations, the precommitment of the union results in lower wages on average, which is bene¯cial to¯rms.
Credibility
In the previous section we showed that the ability of a union to bind itself to commitments regarding future wages leads to a Pareto improvement. But, in the words of Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1989) "in no sense can societies choose between commitment or time consistent equilibria. Commitment technologies are like technologies for making shoes in a Arrow-Debreu modelthey are either available or not.(...) However, (...) actual choices must neces-sarily be delegated to speci¯c institutions or individuals. Society's problem, then (...) is rather designing the process by which policies are chosen."
Because wage-setting involves repeated interactions between the union and¯rms, reputacional considerations can mitigate or even eliminate the time consistency problem. However, it remains true that, some institutions that are in place in some countries, and have been the object of past society's choices can be seen as responsible for the existence or not of a commitment technology. For example, in our view, the corporatist wage bargaining structure of the scandinavian countries, where social contracts are more likely, reinforces the possibility of the emergence of long run wage contracts and therefore of the commitment equilibria. Also the employment performance of these countries con¯rms the predictions of our model. Moreover, one can also argue that both in the case of Portugal and in the case of the Netherlands a credible wage moderation for several years was responsible for the observed rapid growth in employment.
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On the contrary, in other countries, for example in Italy and Spain, real wages and unit labour costs decreased substantially in the 1990's without relevant positive e®ects on employment, even in the recent recovery period. It is interesting to see that Bertola and Ichino (1995) explain this situation precisely by a lack of credibility of the labour market°exibility reforms introduced in both countries.
We do not pretend that these examples are enough to demonstrate the empirical validity of our model. However, they suggest that indeed we observe cases where the credibility aspects associated with wage-setting are important in determining the employment outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predictions of our model.
Reputation building
Given that the union would like to commit to a lower path of wages, we ask in this section whether even in the absence of institutions which facilitate commitment, reputation building might be desirable. We shall consider this from both the point of view of non-Markovian equilibria, where we interpret a loss of reputation to be the shifting of expectations from the low wage path to the higher wage path associated with the previously identi¯ed Markov perfect equilibrium, and, following Fudenberg and Levine (1989) , from the point of view of incomplete information about the union's "type".
Denote the commitment wage as W ¤´b+Á 2 (i.e., the commitment wage when t > 0), where for simplicity we shall maintain the assumption of symmetric adjustment costs, i.e., f = 0. Let ¼ ¤ (l)´F (l)¡W ¤ l be the per-period pro¯t, gross of any adjustment cost, if the wage is W ¤ and the¯rm chooses employment level l, and let ¼ ¤ (l) be maximised by l = l ¤ ; due to F (¢) being quadratic, ¼ ¤ (¢) is symmetric about l ¤ and concave. De¯ne the \commitment utility" u ¤´W ¤ l ¤ + (n ¡ l ¤ )b: As ½ becomes large in the non-perturbed model, it can be checked that the non-commitment equilibrium does not converge to the commitment outcome: in particular the steady-state wage converges to a level above W ¤ : Thus, despite the fact that the adjustment costs become unimportant in the sense that the costs of adjusting to a particular l would have little weight in the discounted pro¯t sum, in the absence of commitment the union will still exploit the costs by keeping wages high.
Our¯rst result (proofs for all results are in Appendix A.3) shows that, for ½ near one, there will be non-Markovian equilibria which yield the commitment outcome; the idea is to switch, as a punishment, to the Markov-perfect equilibrium if the union deviates from the commitment path. The result does not hold if ½ is close to zero. When l t¡1 is close to its steady-state value on the commitment path, it will not be optimal in the short-run to set W t equal or close to W ¤ due to the possibility of exploiting the adjustment costs, but as the future is unimportant, the threat to switch to the Markov-perfect equilibrium will be insu±cient to deter a deviation.
Proposition 5 There exists a critical value for the discount factor ½, 0 < ½ < 1; such that for ½ > ½, the commitment path is the outcome of a perfect equilibrium.
One objection to this approach is that there are many other equilibria, and in addition, with atomistic¯rms the degree of coordination required to execute such a punishment may be implausible. An alternative approach is to assume incomplete information, and this can yield a lower bound on the union's utility across all (Bayes-)Nash equilibria 11 , and thus applies in particular to Markov-perfect equilibria.
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For the purposes of the remainder of the section, we shall assume that the action spaces are bounded, with lower and upper bounds for l and W being given respectively by l; l; W ; W : We suppose that there is a small probability ¹ ¤ that the union might be a type which always plays W ¤ : We allow for a rich \perturbation" of the model, so there may be other types of union committed to other wage paths (stationary or non-stationary) or even with perturbed payo® structures (e.g., di®erent production functions). We show that if the discount factor ½ is close to one, then the union can guarantee itself a payo® very close to the commitment payo® simply by mimicking the W ¤ -commitment type 13 . We adopt a standard incomplete information framework in which the¯rms have a common knowledge prior over possible union types at the beginning of the game.
Proposition 6 For a¯xed value of ¹
¤ > 0 (the prior probability that the union is committed to W ¤ ) and given any » > 0; there exists a critical value for the discount factor ½ ¤ , 0 < ½ ¤ < 1; such that for ½ > ½ ¤ the union receives in any Nash equilibrium an average discounted utility (i.e., normalise discounted utility by premultiplying by
Again, we stress that the proposition makes no restriction on the beliefs of the¯rms other than that stated:¯rms may put positive probability on other union types. The argument proceeds in several steps. First, suppose, at the beginning of some period, that a typical¯rm puts probability at least p on the event that the union will set a wage of W ¤ in each of the next N periods. If p is close to 1; and provided the¯rm is patient enough, and N is large enough, it cannot in this situation have an optimal strategy which on average di®ers from l ¤ by more than " over the next N periods in response to the union actually choosing W ¤ in each period. To make this precise, suppose that at the start of some period ¿ , a¯rm's strategy against W ¤ being chosen in each of the next N periods is f e l t g
¿+N¡1 t=¿
(where N is arbitrary). Then,
Lemma 7
Given any " > 0, we can¯nd a ½, 0 < ½ < 1; an integer N; and a p; 0 < p < 1; such that (1=N )
The basic idea is that over a long enough period, if a patient¯rm does not play close to a best response to W ¤ , it must be better o® switching to a best response as it believes it to be very likely that W ¤ will be played, and any adjustment costs incurred in doing this will be dwarfed by even a small increase in per-period pro¯ts over the long horizon.
The remainder of the argument considers the payo® to the union, in an arbitrary equilibrium, if it should choose W ¤ each period, and we consider rms making predictions every N periods over the next \block" of N periods. The learning result implies that, although¯rms need not always believe that it is very likely that W ¤ is going to be followed over the next N periods, they can only fail to believe this a¯xed number of times. The rest of the time, they will if patient enough, by the lemma, play on average close to a best-response to W ¤ over the N -period block. Provided that the union is su±ciently patient, it gets close to its commitment payo® in blocks when thē rms play close to a best response, and the blocks in which this is not the case will have little e®ect on overall utility, so the union must receive approximately the commitment payo®. As mimicking the commitment type is a feasible strategy in any Nash equilibrium, the union's equilibrium strategy can never yield a lower payo®.
with equilibrium paths with higher wages; (ii) unions increase the speed of adjustment of employment to equilibrium; and (iii) higher adjustment costs imply less employment and higher wages in the long-run. Whether this is the case could be determined empirically, and as some studies have addressed these issues, in this section we discuss the evidence available, in order to see whether the predictions of our model receive empirical support.
Most of the works that addressed empirically the e®ects of job-security policies using aggregate data (macroeconomic data or data from one large industry)¯nd that these policies do slow employment adjustment. (See Hamermesh (1993) for a survey). This inference is especially clear in those studies that compare employment dynamics before and after the introduction of more e®ective job-security policies (Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Hamermesh (1988) and Nickell (1979) ) and in cross-countries studies ( Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) ). However this conclusion is not supported by Burgess (1989) that¯nds no signi¯cative impacts of job-security policies on employment dynamics.
The conclusions about the e®ects of these policies on the level of employment are mixed, but tend to support the view that job-security policies have negative e®ects on the level of employment. Indeed both Dertouzos and Karoly (1990) for the U.S. and Lazear (1990) using panel data for 22 countries,¯nd that these policies reduce employment. Bertola (1990) did not¯nd any e®ect of job-security policies on employment levels, but he used economy wide aggregates. He also does not¯nd that wages are higher in high job security countries, but he¯nds that wage growth is more sensitive to unemployment in high job security countries which con¯rms our no-commitment model predictions.
Turning now to the e®ect of unions on the speed of adjustment of employment, Burgess (1988) ¯nds that the speed of adjustment in UK manufacturing slowed as the economy became more unionized. However Greer and Rhoades' (1977) cross-section evidence shows that more rapid adjustment of employment to output shocks occurs in more unionized industries. Therefore on this issue the evidence is clearly mixed.
We can therefore tentatively conclude that, although on some of these issues the available evidence is mixed, the model presented in this paper seems to receive some empirical support. Of course more empirical studies are needed before more can be said on this matter.
Another important result of our model is that adjustment costs unam-biguosly decrease the value of a¯rm. This in turn may reduce capital accumulation, having further e®ects on employment. Although our model does not consider this issue, this might prove to be an important mechanism and therefore constitutes a natural priority for further research.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analysed the implications of collective bargaining in the presence of labour adjustment costs. We considered a model involving a large number of atomistic identical¯rms and a single, economy-wide union. We showed how adjustment costs in°uence the speed of adjustment of employment and the long run equilibrium, both in the no-commitment and in the commitment games. We conclude, that in the atomistic¯rms case, it is the existence or the absence of a commitment capability of the union that matters. Indeed, in both models and in the competitive case, adjustment costs decrease the speed of adjustment of employment, but the interaction between union power and adjustment costs only makes a di®erence to speeds of adjustment and to long-run values of employment and wages in the nocommitment game (in the sense that adjustment costs have the same e®ect in both the commitment and competitive cases). In the no-commitment case the higher the relevance of adjustment costs the higher the wage and therefore the smaller the level of employment in the long-run. Moreover we also show that commitment on the part of the union leads to lower wages, and is bene¯cial to¯rms as well as to the union. Given that the union would like to commit to a lower path of wages we use a general learning result to show that reputation building is desirable. Moreover our model predictions seem to receive some empirical support. However, the development and the estimation of more theoretically oriented empirical models is clearly a natural priority for further work in the¯eld of this research.
Hence equating coe±cients we obtain:
Now (28), (29) or (30) and (43) are three equations for µ f , ¼ and (¸+ º). So substituting (43) in (28) and using (30) to eliminate ¼ we obtain:
Similarly (34) and (39) are two equations for µ u and c. So solving (34) for c and equating it with (39) using again (30) we obtain:
Solving (44) for (± ¡ µ u ) and substituting it in (45) we get the following quadratic equation for µ f :
where q = (± ¡°+ ½±). Given that µ f is the coe±cient associated with lagged employment in the labour demand equation (7), economic and stability considerations suggest that we should have 0 < µ f < 1. Now both roots of equation (46) are positive and real. Moreover, the smallest root µ f 1 is always below unity. However, for some admissable values in the parameter set both roots can be smaller than unity. Nevertheless, substituting (10) in (7) we obtain the reduced form representation for employment (14) . Therefore stability conditions imply that µ f + ¼µ u < 1. 14 This condition, that using (44) and (30) can be rewritten as µ f < ±=(± ¡°), is only satis¯ed by µ f1 and therefore we can disregard the other root on stability grounds. We have therefore a unique equilibrium with µ f given by (11) . Moreover from (45) we obtain:
However, only the positive solution for µ u satis¯es the condition µ f + ¼µ u < 1.
14 Note that for both roots µ f 1 and µ f 2 it can be shown that µ f + ¼µ u is always positive.
Finally eliminating µ f we obtain the following expression for µ u :
A.2 The steady-state of the no-commitment model
Proof of Proposition 2:
We can write the steady-state wage as:
and the wage in the static union monopoly model is given by:
Now we have that:
for any ± > 0. Morever the LHS of expression (51) collapses to 1=2 when ± = 0: In both models employment is on the labour demand schedule, so the remainder of the proposition follows. In terms of the underlying parameters (and q;see (11)) the steady-state of the no-commitment model collapses to:
and employment is given by the static labour demand equation:
so that:
Note that as q 2 + ± 2 ½ ¡ (½± +°) ³ 2q ¡ p q 2 ¡ 3½± 2´> 0 unemployment bene¯ts a®ect positively the steady-state wage and a®ect negatively the long run level of employment.
A.3
Proofs for Section 5.2
Proof of Proposition 5: De¯ne strategies as follows: for the union, follow the commitment path so long as the¯rms (on average) do likewise. After any deviation, switch to the Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy. For the¯rms, play a best-response to the (future) commitment path provided the union, and¯rms on average, have kept to the path in the past. Otherwise switch to the Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy. As ½ ! 1, steady-state union utility under commitment converges to that of the static union monopoly model, while in the Markov-perfect equilibrium it converges to a smaller amount (since the wage is greater than W ¤ and labour is on the static demand curve). Moreover the coe±cient on lagged employment in the employment equation with commitment is x 1 = (± ¡°+ ± ½¡(¡4 ± 2 ½+(± ¡°+ ± ½) 2 ) 0:5 )=2½± (see (24) ). As ½ ! 1;
µ f + ¼µ u ; the coe±cient on lagged employment in the employment equation without commitment is also bounded below 1: Equivalently, convergence to the steady state is at a rate which is bounded above zero; hence it follows that as ½ ! 1; average discounted utility under both commitment and no commitment converges, for all l t¡1 in any bounded interval, to the respective limiting steady-state levels, with the commitment level being higher. For any t, on the commitment path l t 2 [l ¡1 ; l ¤ ]: Consequently for ½ su±ciently close to 1 deviation by the union at t + 1, which yields at most the continuation utility from the Markov-perfect equilibrium, is unpro¯table.
Proof of Lemma 7: First, for " > 0; let ¢(") be de¯ned by
(a solution to this clearly exists, and ¢(") > 0). Next, given a value for ";¯nd a p satisfying 0 < p < 1, and an integer N , such that
where ¼ is the minimum (in¯mum) per-period gross pro¯t from choosing l ¤ ; and ¹ ¼ is the maximum (supremum) per-period pro¯t that can be earned (both exist by W being bounded). Clearly for N large enough, and p su±ciently close to 1, this is possible. Suppose that from the start of period ¿, a¯rm's strategy f e l t g ¿ +N ¡1 t=¿ against W ¤ for each of the next N periods implies that (1=N )
where the¯rst equality follows from the symmetry of ¼ ¤ (¢) about l ¤ ; thē rst inequality from Jensen's Inequality ( ¼ ¤ (¢) concave), the second from substitution for (1=N )
and the fact that ¼ ¤ (¢) is decreasing for l > l ¤ ; and the last equality from the de¯nition of ¢("). In other words, if the¯rm's strategy against W ¤ over the next N periods implies that on average it is not playing a best-response to W ¤ by an amount " (ignoring adjustment costs), then its average pro¯t is at least ¢(") lower than its best-response pro¯t. Next, consider what happens if the¯rm changes its strategy as follows: for the next N periods (i.e., ¿ to ¿ + N ¡ 1) choose l t = l ¤ ; irrespective of wages, and from ¿ + N follow the original strategy (i.e., after each possible path of wages fW t g ¿ +N t=¿ , revert to the original choice of l ¿+N after this path, and continue doing so thereafter). The undiscounted payo® over the next N periods from the new strategy is N ¼ ¤ (l ¤ ) if W ¤ is followed, and at worst N ¼ if it is not; moreover adjustment costs|which are only incurred in the¯rst period|are at most (0:5)± maxf( ¹ l ¡ l ¤ ) 2 ; (l ¡ l ¤ ) 2 g. The undiscounted payo® from the original strategy is at most, by (56), N (¼ ¤ (l ¤ ) ¡ ¢(")) if W ¤ is followed, and at most N ¹ ¼ otherwise. Pro¯ts also di®er at ¿ + N only because of adjustment costs; but, the new pro¯ts are at most (0:5)± maxf( ¹ l ¡ l ¤ ) 2 ; (l ¡ l ¤ ) 2 g smaller. Thus, by (55), for p > p the undiscounted expected pro¯t over the next N + 1 periods from the new strategy is higher. It follows that we can also¯nd a ½ such that for ½ > ½ the same is true of discounted pro¯ts (because per-period pro¯ts are bounded). Since payo®s after ¿ + N are una®ected, for such ½ the new strategy is more pro¯table, which is impossible and so contradicts the hypothesis that (1=N ) ½; the average discounted utility from choosing W ¤ over the next N periods, which we denote as u ¿ (N )´(1 ¡ ½ N )(1 ¡ ½)
, is within »=2 of u ¤ (again this follows from the boundedness of perperiod utility). The¯nal step in the argument requires the lower bound on the speed of learning established by Fudenberg and Levine (1989) . Adapting their argument from predictions made over a single period, to predictions made over blocks of N periods, we can state the result as follows. De¯nē rst p ¿ (N ) to be the probability that W ¤ will be played in periods ¿; ¿ + 1; : : : ; ¿ + N ¡ 1, conditional on it having been played in every period up to ¿ ¡ 1 (i.e., given the prior beliefs of¯rms and the particular equilibrium being played). Then, given a¯xed positive value for ¹ ¤ , and given some p, 0 < p < 1, there exists a numberñ depending only on ¹ ¤ and p, such that the sequence p 0 (N ); p N (N ); p 2N (N ); : : : has at mostñ values less than p. In other words, if predictions are made every N periods about the next N periods, there is an upper bound on the number of predictions that say that it is \unlikely" (probability less than p) that W ¤ will be chosen over each of the next N periods, assuming that in fact W ¤ is continuously chosen by the union. Applying this result for the values of p; and N that were¯xed earlier gives the value ofñ: Then it follows from the lemma and the learning result, that provided ½¸½, there are at mostñ \N -period blocks" for which (1=N ) 
given that the worst that can happen in a p < p block is that the union gets its minimum utility, which we denote U , and that, because of discounting, this happens in the¯rstñ blocks. Find a critical e ½ such that for ½ > e ½ the expression in (57) is within »=2 of u ¤ ¡ »=2; and set ½ ¤ = maxfb ½; ½; e ½g; it follows that provided ½ > ½ ¤ if the union always plays W ¤ it must receive at least u ¤ ¡»; if it received less than this in any Nash equilibrium the mimicking strategy would thus provide a pro¯table deviation, contrary to the de¯nition of equilibrium. :
